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Abstract: In this article, we consider technology leaders (which are innovators) and technology
followers (which are non-innovators) to provide a new theoretical explanation for the well-cited
empirical evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and aggregate innovation. We
consider a two-stage game with a deterministic Research and Development (R&D) process, where
the leaders first determine their R&D investments simultaneously and then all leaders and followers
determine their outputs simultaneously. We show that the inverted-U relationship between competition and aggregate innovation occurs if competition is affected by the number of technology
followers. However, the presence of more technology leaders decreases individual R&D investments
while increasing aggregate R&D investments. If the total number of firms remains the same but the
composition of technology leaders and followers changes in favor of leaders (followers), individual
R&D investments decrease (increase) but aggregate R&D investments increase (decrease). The relationship between competition and R&D investments can be U-shaped if the intensity of competition
is measured by product substitutability. Contrary to the standard expectation, the presence of more
firms may reduce welfare.
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Economists have long been interested in understanding the relationship between
competition and innovation which, in the words of Shapiro [1], is one of the most important
questions in industrial organization. The debate goes back to the pioneering works of Arrow
and Schumpeter [2,3], which focused on perfectly competitive markets and monopolies.
The more recent literature examines the relationship in the context of imperfect competition
and oligopolistic markets.
In this paper, we contribute to this age-old debate by considering technology leaders
(which are innovators in our analysis) and technology followers (which are non-innovators
in our analysis). As Vives [4] mentioned, “Innovation is claimed to be the engine of growth
(see e.g., Aghion & Howitt, Grossman & Helpman and Romer [5–10]) and therefore it is
crucial to understand its determinants.” While the literature discussed below looked at
several determinants of innovation, the extant literature ignored the fact that technology
leaders and followers co-exist in reality. We include this dimension to expand this extensive
and lively literature.
We consider a Cournot oligopoly with n technology leaders and m technology followers, (See, for example, [11–13], to name a few, which consider innovating and noninnovating firms in different contexts.), where innovation is assumed to be deterministic
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(as in Cellini & Lambertini, Ishida et al, Mukherjee & Ray and Spence [14–17]), and the
firms produce horizontally differentiated products. Firms face demand functions similar to
those considered in Cellini & Lambertini, and Sacco & Schmutzler [14,18].
In this framework (One of the demand functions considered in Schumpeter [3] is
similar to ours), we show how (i) the number of technology leaders and followers, (ii) the
degree of product substitutability, and (iii) the composition of technology leaders and
followers affect the equilibrium R&D investments and the resulting social welfare.
By combining volume and composition of competitors alongside product diversity, we
are able to provide a richer and more granular view of the relationship between competition
and innovation. By keeping the demand function comparable to the that described in the
existing literature and allowing for deterministic innovation, we are able to achieve nice
contrasts with the existing literature. In this way, our paper complements and expands
the current literature by providing new results without negating any of the currently
known explanations.
We provide a new theoretical explanation for the well-cited empirical evidence of an
inverted-U relationship between competition and aggregate innovation (Aghion et al. [19]).
Aghion et al. [19] provides a theoretical explanation for the inverted-U relationship based
on stochastic step-by-step innovation. However, to our knowledge, there is no theoretical
explanation for the inverted-U relationship between competition and aggregate innovation
for non-stochastic innovation or deterministic R&D, which is widely considered in the
literature [4,14–17,20–22].
We show that the inverted-U relationship may occur for non-stochastic or deterministic Research and Development (R&D) in the presence of technology leaders and technology
followers. This may happen if competition is affected by the number of technology followers. Thus, our paper makes an important contribution to the competition and innovation
literature by including a simpler, widely used framework of deterministic innovation.
Our work complements the influential work of Aghion et al. [19] by being able
to generate the inverted-U relationship between competition and aggregate innovation
even in the presence of deterministic innovation with standard demand functions. This
contribution results in a more robust inverted-U relationship between competition and
aggregate innovation.
We find that the presence of a larger number of technology leaders decreases individual
R&D investments but increases aggregate R&D investments. If the total number of firms
remains the same but the composition of technology leaders and followers changes in
favor of the leaders (followers), the individual R&D investments decrease (increase) but
the aggregate R&D investments increase (decrease). The relationship between competition
and R&D investments can be U-shaped if the intensity of competition is measured by
product substitutability.
Contrary to the standard expectation that competition and welfare both increase with
the number of firms, we show that the presence of a larger number of firms may reduce
welfare. In this way, our paper also contributes to the established literature on welfare
reducing entry [16,23–25].
Welfare reducing entry is a lively and fascinating phenomenon, as the classical theory
of competition generally argues that a larger number of competitors would drive the market
more towards perfect competition that improves welfare, in contrast to an imperfectly
competitive situation. Contrary to that standard insight, welfare reducing entry essentially
posits that welfare may suffer adversely with the entry of a firm into the market.
A general feature of the current literature is to consider all firms as innovators or
technology leaders. (Bester & Petrakis [11] is an exception. They considered innovating
and non-innovating firms while examining the effects of different types of competition,
viz., Cournot and Bertrand on R&D investments. Unlike them, we show the effects of
the number of firms and product differentiation on R&D investments). This assumption
may sound innocuous at the outset, but it may not entirely align with market realities.
It is rarely the case that each firm in an industry engages in innovative activities at the
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same level of intensity as other firms. In other words, markets are mostly dominated by
a fraction of firms that engage in innovative activities, while others are content to use
generally available technologies to earn profits, so long as it is achievable under certain
circumstances. The presence of non-innovating firms alongside innovating firms has been
captured in a number of studies in the literature [26,27]. (Whether firms undertake R&D
may depend on several factors, such as market orientation, business objectives, competitive
advantages, absorptive capacity, and internal knowledge resources).
There are also strong empirical reasons for building our model this way. According to
Eurostat in March 2017 (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?
title=Archive:Innovation_statistics&oldid=510766, accessed on 27 November 2021), during
2012–2014 almost half of all enterprises in the European Union (EU) undertook some
form of innovation activity. In other words, a significant number of the EU firms did not
undertake any innovative activities during 2012–2014. In the pharmaceutical industry, for
example, not all firms innovate, as the industry is populated by a significant number of
firms that take advantage of generic products after the expiration of patents, while not
devoting significant resources to R&D activities to invent new drugs or earn new patents.
There are also vast differences in innovative activities across nations and continents,
and those differences often lead to different paths of economic development. Although
firms from some developing or newly industrialized countries engage in innovative activities, most of the world’s innovating firms and new technologies are overly concentrated
in the developed countries (see the references in Mukherjee & Sinha [28]). For example,
the big technology, telecommunication, e-commerce, and entertainment companies such as
Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Cisco, Oracle, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Twitter,
IBM, Intel, HP, Dell, AT&T, and Disney, are all American companies whose products are
used by billions of people from all over the world.
With notable exceptions such as Samsung (South Korea), LG (South Korea), Huawei
(China), Alibaba (China), Hitachi (Japan), and Panasonic (Japan), very few globally dominant large technology companies come from other countries. The same goes for the
automotive sector. Most of the world’s new automotive technologies come from only
a handful of countries, such as the USA (GM, Ford, Chrysler, Tesla, etc.), Japan (Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Mitsubishi, etc.), Korea (Kia and Hyundai) and Germany (Mercedes,
Volkswagen, BMW, etc.). Hence, the majority of countries are primarily users of such
advanced technologies, and not primary innovators. Simply put, the overall global market
is inhabited by both technology leaders and technology followers.
Given the non-uniformness of innovative activities across firms, the applicability of
the existing literature (reviewed in the next section) examining the relationship between
competition and innovation may be limited. This is simply because the strategic interactions
in the R&D stage are much lower in industries with a limited number of technology leaders
than in industries with many innovators. This strategic interaction is the key driver for our
results. By exploiting the difference between industries where the proportion of innovators
varies significantly, we provide a new perspective to the literature on competition and
innovation. We show how different concentrations of technology leaders and followers, as
well as product substitutability, affect innovation and social welfare.
Focusing on both innovating and non-innovating firms, our results provide the following testable hypotheses for future empirical studies: first, given the number of innovators,
we would expect more R&D investments in industries with a moderate number of noninnovators, compared to industries with small and large numbers of non-innovators;
second, for a given number of non-innovators, we would expect less individual R&D
investment but more aggregate R&D investment as the number of innovators increases;
third, for a given number of innovators and non-innovators, we would expect more R&D
investments for low- and high-product differentiation, compared to moderate product
differentiation; finally, when looking at industries with similar total numbers of firms, we
would expect less individual R&D investment but more aggregate R&D investment in
industries with more innovators.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we review the literature in
Section 2; Section 3 describes the main model and shows the results of competition and
R&D investments by considering the changes in technology leaders, technology followers,
and product substitutability; Section 4 considers the effects of a change in the number of
technology leaders, while keeping the total number of firms the same; Section 5 suggests
some possible future research; and Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2. Literature Review
The debate concerning the relationship between competition and innovation goes
back to Arrow and Schumpeter [2,3]. While they considered a perfectly competitive market
and a monopoly to show the effects of competition on innovation, more recent literature
focused on oligopolistic markets. Given the vast literature on competition and innovation,
we will discuss some related papers in the following discussion. While our discussion
is topical and pertinent to the specific studies mentioned in this paper, one may look at
Shapiro and Gilbert [1,29] for nice overviews of this literature.
In one of the earlier studies, Spence [17] showed that with a deterministic R&D
and a constant elasticity demand curve, the relationship between the number of innovating firms and individual R&D investments is inverted-U-shaped. Hence, he did not
explain the empirical evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and
aggregate innovation.
In a patent race model with Cournot competition, Delbono & Denicolò [30] showed
that if R&D is non-drastic, a higher competition has an ambiguous effect on R&D investment, but for a drastic R&D, a higher competition increases R&D investment. Using the
Lerner index as a measure of competition, Aghion et al. [19] showed that competition and
aggregate innovation have an inverted-U relationship. (Earlier empirical papers by Blundell et al, Geroski and Nickell [31–33] found a positive relationship between competition
and innovation). They used a theoretical model with stochastic step-by-step innovation to
explain the inverted-U relationship while measuring competition as the inability to collude.
Considering stochastic innovation and mergers to reduce competition, Federico et al. [34,35]
showed that increased competition increases drastic product innovation. In contrast, we
explain the inverted-U relationship between competition and aggregate innovation for
non-stochastic innovation.
Banker et al. [36] showed how competition affects firms’ investments in quality. They
found that if competition is increased by making a firm’s demand potential more symmetric, a higher competition decreases (increases) investment in quality by the firm with a
high (low) demand potential. Comparing competition with cooperation, they showed that
investment in quality is higher under competition unless the synergic benefit from cooperation is large. If competition is created by more firms, investment in quality decreases if
the cost of quality improvement is independent of competition intensity. If the competitive
intensity creates a synergic benefit and the cost of quality improvement decreases with
competitive intensity, the presence of more firms may increase investment in quality.
Applying the real options approach, Childs & Triantis [37] considered investments in
multiple projects and showed that competition that alters the drift of the net present value
of a project decreases overall investment. (One may look at Trigeorgis [38] for the effects of
competitive entry on investment decisions in a real options setting).
Vives [4] considered that firms choose investment-price or investment-output pairs
in a two-stage open-loop game, i.e., where the actions in the first stage are not perfectly
observable. In this framework, he showed that more firms reduce R&D investments, (The
negative relationship between competition and innovation can be found in many other
papers, such as [39–45]), but lower product differentiation increases R&D investment if the
total market for varieties does not shrink. He showed that these results are quite general, in
that they hold up under different demand structures and with or without entry. (Although
Vives [4] considered a very general model, his analysis did not explain the inverted-U
relationship. He was trying intuitively to reconcile the inverted-U relationship with his
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analysis by appealing to the liquidation effect. As he mentioned in footnote 25 of his
paper, “We might also try to explain an inverted-U relationship between an average Lerner
index and average innovation output (or effort) in an industry with asymmetric firms and
composition effects.” However, he did not carry out any analyses with asymmetric firms).
Boudreau et al. [46] showed empirically that increased competition decreases (increases)
R&D investments in contests for low-uncertainty (high-uncertainty) problems.
In a dynamic model with deterministic R&D and Bertrand competition, Cellini &
Lambertini [14] showed that more firms increase R&D investment, but a lower product
differentiation either decreases R&D investment or creates a U-shaped relationship. Sacco
and Schmutzler [18] showed that there can be a U-shaped relationship between competition
and innovation when the higher competition is measured by lower product differentiation.
While their laboratory experiments partly confirmed the U-shaped relationship in a reduced
one-stage version of the game, the two-stage version showed a negative relationship. (There
is some experimental evidence showing that competition, measured in terms of the number
of firms, reduces R&D investments Darai et al, Isaac & Reynolds [47–49]).
Schumtzler [50] considered a duopoly model to show the effects of product differentiation on R&D investments for different demand specifications. For a demand function
similar to the one considered in this paper, he showed that if the firms are symmetric,
lower product differentiation creates a U-shaped (negative) relationship with R&D investments under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. However, if a firm has a lower marginal
cost initially, lower product differentiation increases its R&D investments. In the working
paper version ([51]), he showed that if there are more firms, there is a negative relationship
between competition and innovation if the firms are symmetric. However, if the entrant is
less efficient than the incumbent, entry may raise the investment of the incumbent.
Ishida et al. [15] showed that an increase in the number of high-cost firms increases the
R&D investments of low-cost firms. Mukherjee & Ray [16] extended this analysis to focus
on asymmetric R&D capabilities and showed that R&D investments and profits reduce with
more firms, irrespective of their R&D capabilities. They also showed that more firms may
reduce welfare, irrespective of their R&D capabilities. (There is a literature showing how
different types of competition, viz., Bertrand and Cournot competition, affect innovation
(see, e.g., [11,49,52–57]). However, unlike the present paper, those papers consider the
effects of different strategic variables on innovation. In contrast, we consider the effect of
the number of firms, while maintaining the same strategic variable).
Spulber [58] showed the effects of competition among producers and competition
among inventors on the incentive for innovation. It showed that competition among
producers increases the incentive for innovation, while competition among inventors also
increases the incentive for innovation when the product market is competitive. Spulber [59]
showed that the relationship between competition and innovation may depend on the
strength of intellectual property protection. Competitive pressure increases innovation
if intellectual property protection is appropriable. However, competitive pressure may
reduce innovation if intellectual property protection is not fully appropriable. (Spulber [60]
discussed how competition policy may reduce the incentive for innovation by weakening
intellectual property protection. Spulber [61] discussed how technology standards, the
competitive conduct of firms, and economic performance are jointly determined via markets
and cooperative institutions). These papers considered a situation where the inventors
were different from the producers. The inventors invented new technologies and sold their
technologies to producers. In contrast, we consider vertical integration of innovation and
production. (One may also look at Spulber [62] for further discussions on this issue).
There is literature that showed how mergers and overlapping ownership, influencing the
intensity of competition, affect innovation. Considering stochastic R&D, Federico et al. [34,35]
showed that mergers reduce the R&D investments of merged entities. Denicolò & Polo [63]
showed that mergers may increase the R&D investments of merged entities if the probability
of failure in innovation is log-concave, which encourages e merged firms not to operate all
possible research labs, thus helping to avoid duplication of R&D efforts by merged firms. Using
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a deterministic R&D process, Motta & Tarantino [64] showed that in the absence of spillovers
and synergy, merger reduces R&D investments. Bourreau and Jullien [65] showed that merger
may increase investment in innovation by expanding demand due to increased market coverage.
Using deterministic R&D, López & Vives [66] showed that an increase in overlapping ownership,
which increases collusive behavior, decreases investments in process innovation in the absence
of knowledge spillover. Unlike our paper, none of these papers explained the inverted-U
relationship between competition and innovation.
Although the papers mentioned above examined the relationship between competition
and innovation under different economic scenarios, they could not explain the inverted-U
relationship between competition and aggregate innovation for non-stochastic innovation.
A common feature of those papers was to consider that all firms are innovators which, as
mentioned in the introduction, is not necessarily the case. When we adopt a more realistic
set-up with innovators and non-innovators, we can explain the inverted-U relationship
between competition and aggregate innovation for non-stochastic innovation. Our analysis
with innovators and non-innovators complements and contrasts with the existing literature.
(We considered exogenous number of firms, which is often considered in the literature
we reviewed. Numerous other papers consider the market structure and innovation,
endogenously and jointly. [4,40,41,44,67–69] We provide only an overview that is relevant
to our investigation).
Our paper also complements the literature on welfare-reducing entry. While this
literature showed the implications of cost asymmetry (Klemperer and Lahiri & Ono [24,25])
and government policies (Dinda & Mukherjee [23]), we show the implications of innovation.
While Mukherjee & Ray [16] also showed that higher competition may reduce welfare, they
considered neither innovating and non-innovating firms, nor the effects of competition
on innovation. (There is other literature showing that free entry of firms can be welfare
reducing. See Mankiw & Whinston [70] for a pioneering work in this area. However, there
is no free entry in our analysis).
The differences between the innovativeness of firms have also attracted considerable
academic interest in general management and accounting literature. In a recent study covering 4545 American firms between 1968 and 2018, Machokoto et al. [71] found significant
relationship between competition and firms’ innovativeness. The willingness and ability of
firms to learn innovative activities over time in Machokoto [71] was entirely consistent with
the general feature that not all firms in an industry may be equally innovative, although
they may learn in the long term.
Although the differences in innovativeness across firms, industries, and countries are
well-documented, the drivers of the same differences are also the subject of intense focus.
The culture of innovation has been identified as one of the major drivers for the differences
in innovative activities Chandler & Krajcsak and Lam et al. [72,73]. The critical role of
diversity has also been studied as a potential driver for the differences in innovativeness as
in Hewlett et al. [74].
3. The Model and the Results
Consider an economy with n technology leaders (innovating firms) and m technology followers (non-innovating firms), who compete in the product market like Cournot
oligopolists. We assume that the firms produce horizontally differentiated products, and
that there is at least one firm in each category, i.e., n, m ≥ 1.
Financial constraints or lack of relevant technical knowledge may prevent some firms
from engaging in innovative activities. It is also possible that the technology followers
are in geographic regions that are not rich in R&D workforce. In geographic terms, we
may also assume that the technology leaders are from developed countries, which are in
possession of a rich set of innovative capabilities including financial architecture, legal
expertise, political support, and an R&D workforce that is trained in the latest scientific
and technical knowledge.
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The technology followers may be assumed to be from developing countries or from
regions lacking an R&D infrastructure and workforce, in that they have yet to build an
appropriate innovation-related infrastructure and educational ecosystem to undertake
complex R&D activities. For simplicity, and to keep our model tractable, we will consider
the number of firms as a continuous variable.
All firms enjoy the same initial constant marginal cost of production, c. This assumption is made to eliminate the effects of initial cost asymmetry on our results, so that we are
able to capture the impact of technology leaders and followers in a more straightforward
way. We assume that innovation leads to lower cost of production. The ith technology
leader, i = 1, 2, . . . , n can invest xi amount in R&D to reduce its cost of production to
(c − xi ) > 0. The cost of R&D, R( xi ) is increasing and sufficiently convex to guarantee
interior solutions. The R&D cost function suggests that there is diminishing return for
R&D expenditures. (This is a standard assumption in the literature. [20] A justification for
this assumption is that “the technological possibilities linking R&D inputs and innovative
outputs do not display any economies of scale with respect to the size of the firm in which
R&D is undertaken” (Dasgupta [75], p. 523)).
We assume that the inverse market demand functions of the ith technology leader and
the jth technology follower are, respectively
!
!
pi = a − qi − γ

∑ q−i + ∑ q∗j
−i

and p∗j = a − q∗j − γ

j

∑ qi + ∑ q∗− j
i

(1)

−j

where i = 1, . . . , n, j = n + 1, . . . . . . , n + m and pi and p∗j represent the ith technology
leader’s price and the jth technology follower’s price, respectively, and qi and q∗j denote the
ith technology leader’s output and the jth technology follower’s output, respectively. The
parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] shows the degree of product substitutability. The goods are perfect
substitutes for γ = 1 and they are independent for γ = 0.
We consider the following game. At stage 1, the technology leaders determine their
R&D investments simultaneously, and the outcome of R&D is realized. At stage 2, the
firms choose their outputs simultaneously, and the profits are realized. We solve the game
through backward induction.
The profit functions of the ith technology leader and the jth technology follower
are, respectively:
πi (qi , q∗j ; xi ) = [ pi − (c − xi )]qi − R( xi ), i = 1, . . . , n

(2)

π ∗j (qi , q∗j ) = [ p∗j − c]q∗j , j = n + 1, . . . , n + m

(3)

Given the R&D investments of the technology leaders, the equilibrium outputs can be
determined as:

(2−γ)( a−c)+[γ(m+n−2)+2] xi −γ∑−i x−i

qi ( xi ) =
(2−γ)[γ(m+n−1)+2]
(4)
(2−γ)( a−c)−γ i xi

q∗j ( xi ) = (2−γ)[γ(m+n−1∑)+
.
2]
By way of a simple partial statics, we obtain the following:
dqi ( xi )
dxi

=

dq−i ( xi )
dxi

[γ(m+n−2)+2]
(2−γ)[γ(m+n−1)+2]

=

dq∗j ( xi )
dxi

=

>0

−γ
(2−γ)[γ(m+n−1)+2]





(5)


< 0, 

where x−i is the R&D investment vector of all innovating firms other than i. The equations
in (5) show that a higher R&D investment of the ith technology leader increases its own
output but decreases the outputs of technology followers and other technology leaders by
making the ith technology leader firm more cost-efficient.



dq− i ( xi ) dq ( xi )
−γ
=
= (2−γ )[γ ( m + n −1) + 2] < 0, 

dxi
dxi
i

(5)

*
j
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the cost
effect
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theHence,
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in- of
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3.1. Discussion and Analysis

Changes in the Total Number of Firms
We are now able to show the effects of competition on R&D investments. From Equation (7), we obtain the following:
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𝑞(𝑥 ) = 𝑅 (𝑥 ).

Hence, the equilibrium outputs are:
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Table 1. The impact of the number of firms on individual R&D investment.

Strategic Effect on Other
Technology Leaders
m
n

−
+,−

Strategic Effect on
Technology
Output Effect
Followers
+,−
−
−
−

Total Effect
+,−
−
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Table 1. The impact of the number of firms on individual R&D investment.
Strategic Effect on Other
Technology Leaders

Strategic Effect on
Technology Followers

Output Effect

Total Effect

m

−

+,−

−

+,−

n

+,−

−

−

−

As shown in Table 1, the strategic effects of m on other technology leaders and the
output of the concerned technology leader are always negative, but the strategic
effect


on technology followers is ambiguous and depends on (γn − γ + 2)q xC − γmq∗ xC .
When we combine these three effects, we find a non-monotonic relationship between m
and the R&D investment of each technology leader.
The strategic effect of n on other technology leaders is ambiguous, depending on
(γ(m − n) + γ + 2). However, the strategic effects of n on technology followers and the
output of the concerned technology leader are negative. When the strategic impact on
other technology leaders is negative, it is clear that the total effect is negative. When the
strategic effect on other technology leaders is positive, it is always dominated by the latter
two negative effects. Thus, an increase in n reduces the equilibrium of the R&D investment
of each technology leader.
Assuming that R( xi ) = xi2 , we obtain the symmetric equilibrium R&D investment of
each technology leader as follows:
xC =

( a−c)(2−γ)(2+γ(m+n−2))
(12+γ(2(−13+6m+7n)+γ(22+3m2 +7m(−3+n)−4γ(−2+m+n)(−1+m+n)
2
2

+γ (−1 + m + n) + n(−23 + 4n))))
Figure 1a plots
0<

1 ∂xC
( a−c) ∂m

for n ∈ [1, 10], m ∈ [1, 10] and γ ∈ [0, 1]. (We can obtain

xC

< c for these parameter values).
1 ∂xC
The shaded (white) region in Figure 1a shows (a−
> (<)0. Figure 1b magnifies
c) ∂m
the shaded region of Figure 1a by considering that n = 2 and γ ∈ [0.9, 1].
It follows from Figure 1a,b that if the products are not close substitutes (i.e., γ < 0.945),
there is a negative relationship between m and the R&D investment of each technology
leader. On the other hand, if the products are perfect substitutes (i.e., γ = 1), there is a
positive relationship between m and the R&D investment of each technology leader, as
1 ∂xC
( a−c) ∂m γ=1

=

1
2
(1+m+n+mn+n2 )

> 0. However, if the products are close substitutes but not

perfect substitutes, the relationship between m and the R&D investment of each technology
leader is positive for lower values of m, but negative for higher values of m, thus showing
an inverted-U relationship between the number of technology followers and the R&D investment of each technology leader. As the number of technology leaders is independent of
the number of technology followers, the number of technology followers and the aggregate
R&D investments of the technology leader will also show an inverted-U relationship.
It follows from Equation (9) that the presence of more technology leaders, i.e., a higher
n, decreases the R&D investment of each technology leader. Next, we show the effects of n
on the aggregate R&D investments of the technology leaders. At the symmetric equilibrium,
∂xC
∂xC
C
the aggregate R&D investment is X = nxC . We get dX
dn = x + n ∂n > 0, where ∂n < 0.
Figure 1c shows a case with n ∈ [1, 10], m ∈ [1, 10] and γ ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 1c shows that an increase in the number of technology leaders increases the
aggregate R&D investments of the technology leaders. If the number of technology leaders
increases, there are more innovators investing in R&D, which has a positive direct effect
on aggregate R&D investment. However, we have already seen that a new technology
leader will reduce the R&D investment of each existing technology leader, which has a
negative indirect effect on aggregate R&D investment. We find that the former direct effect

equilibrium, the aggregate R&D investment is 𝑋 = 𝑛𝑥 . We get
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=𝑥 +𝑛

> 0,

where
< 0. Figure 1c shows a case with 𝑛 ∈ [1,10], 𝑚 ∈ [1,10] and 𝛾 ∈ [0,1].
Figure 1c shows that an increase in the number of technology leaders increases the
aggregate R&D investments of the technology leaders. If the number of technology leaders increases, there are more innovators investing in R&D, which has a positive direct
11 of 20
effect on aggregate R&D investment. However, we have already seen that a new technology leader will reduce the R&D investment of each existing technology leader, which has
a negative indirect effect on aggregate R&D investment. We find that the former direct
dominates
the latter
effect, and
theand
presence
of moreoftechnology
leadersleaders
increases
effect dominates
theindirect
latter indirect
effect,
the presence
more technology
aggregate
investments.
increases R&D
aggregate
R&D investments.
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The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows: more firms create two opposing effects.
On the one hand, more firms reduce the technology leaders’ marginal benefits from innovation, which tends to reduce R&D investments. On the other hand, more firms encourage
technology leaders to invest more to improve their competitive positions. While the first
effect has a Schumpeterian overtone, the second effect is similar to Arrow’s replacement
effect, or the escape competition effect of [19].
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The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows: more firms create two opposing effects. On
the one hand, more firms reduce the technology leaders’ marginal benefits from innovation,
which tends to reduce R&D investments. On the other hand, more firms encourage
technology leaders to invest more to improve their competitive positions. While the first
effect has a Schumpeterian overtone, the second effect is similar to Arrow’s replacement
effect, or the escape competition effect of [19].
If the new firm is a technology leader, we find that the first effect dominates the
second effect, and more technology leaders reduce the equilibrium R&D investment of each
technology leader by lowering technology leaders’ marginal benefits from innovation. As
the new firm is a technology leader, the replacement effect or the escape competition effect
is not strong enough to outweigh the first effect. However, the R&D investment of the new
technology leader adds to aggregate R&D investment. Hence, even if more technology
leaders reduce the individual R&D investments of the technology leaders, it increases the
aggregate R&D investments of the technology leaders.
If the new firm is a technology follower, the replacement effect or the escape competition effect is stronger when compared to the situation where the entrant is a technology
leader, as it is easier to steal market share from a high-cost technology follower than from a
Games 2022, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW
13 of 21
low-cost technology leader. Hence, more technology followers may increase or decrease
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Cellini & Lambertini, Sacco & Schmutzler and Schmutzler [14,18,50] also
found simwith
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and
unlike
Sacco
&
Schmutzler
and
Schmutilar results. However, unlike Cellini & Lambertini [14], we consider Cournot competition

with innovating and non-innovating firms, and unlike Sacco & Schmutzler and Schmutzler [18,50], we consider oligopoly with innovating and non-innovating firms. Thus, we
complement these previous papers.
The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
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zler [18,50], we consider oligopoly with innovating and non-innovating firms. Thus, we
complement these previous papers.
The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For a given n and m, the relationship between competition and individual as
well as aggregate R&D investments can be U-shaped if the higher competition is due to higher
product substitutability.
3.3. Welfare Implications
It is generally believed that competition increases welfare. We will show in this
subsection that increased competition may reduce welfare.
As all technology leaders produce the same outputs and all technology followers
produce the same outputs, we obtain equilibrium welfare as follows:



n ( n −1) q + m ( m −1) q ∗
∗
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that a higher n reduces welfare if the products are close substitutes (i.e., γ is high). The
that a higher n reduces welfare if the products are close substitutes (i.e., 𝛾 is high). The
reason for this result is as follows: on the one hand, a higher n tends to increase welfare by
reason for this result is as follows: on the one hand, a higher n tends to increase welfare
increasing competition; on the other hand, it tends to reduce welfare by reducing marginal
by increasing competition; on the other hand, it tends to reduce welfare by reducing marcost reduction by each technology leader. If the products are close substitutes (i.e., γ is
ginal cost reduction by each technology leader. If the products are close substitutes (i.e.,
high), the firms face significant competition from each other, and a higher n creates a
𝛾 is high), the firms face significant competition from each other, and a higher n creates a
significantly adverse effect on marginal cost reduction by the technology leaders, which
significantly
effect on marginal
reduction
technology
leaders,
which
dominates theadverse
welfare-increasing
effect ofcost
a higher
n. In by
thisthe
situation,
a higher
n reduces
dominates
the welfare-increasing
effect
a higher
n. In this
situation,
higher
n reduces
welfare.
However,
if the products are
notofclose
substitutes,
the
intensityaof
competition
is
welfare.
However,
if
the
products
are
not
close
substitutes,
the
intensity
of
competition
is
low, and a higher n does not significantly reduce marginal cost reduction by technology
low, and a higher n does not significantly reduce marginal cost reduction by technology
leaders. In this situation, the former effect dominates the latter effect to increase welfare
following a higher n.
Unlike Klemperer and Lahiri & Ono [24,25], this result shows that entry of a firm may
reduce welfare even if the entrant is not cost-inefficient. This result complements Mukherjee & Ray [16] by showing that entry of an innovator may reduce welfare in the presence
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leaders. In this situation, the former effect dominates the latter effect to increase welfare
following a higher n.
Unlike Klemperer and Lahiri & Ono [24,25], this result shows that entry of a firm
may reduce welfare even if the entrant is not cost-inefficient. This result complements
Mukherjee & Ray [16] by showing that entry of an innovator may reduce welfare in the
presence of innovating and non-innovating firms.
Next, we consider the effects of m on welfare. We know from Klemperer and Lahiri &
Ono [24,25] that entry of a firm may reduce welfare if the entrant has sufficiently higher
marginal costs than the incumbents. This happens because the entry of a high-cost entrant
creates production inefficiency by stealing business from low-cost incumbents. Entry of a
technology follower creates a similar situation in the presence of technology leaders, with
the exception that it affects the marginal costs of technology leaders by affecting their R&D
Games 2022, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW
of 21
investments. We show in Figure 4 that the presence of more technology followers15may
create lower welfare, as in Klemperer and Lahiri & Ono [24,25].
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ments (which follows from Equation (8)), but, as in Klemperer and Lahiri & Ono [24,25],
create production inefficiency by stealing business from technology leaders. We find
theythe
create
production
inefficiency
bydominates
stealing business
from effect
technology
leaders. We
find
that
production
inefficiency
effect
the positive
on innovation,
and
a
that
the
production
inefficiency
effect
dominates
the
positive
effect
on
innovation,
and
higher m reduces welfare. However, if the products are not close substitutes, the intensitya
m reduces
welfare.
if the
products
are not close
substitutes,
the is
intensity
ofhigher
competition
is low,
and However,
therefore the
adverse
production
inefficiency
effect
weak.
of
competition
is
low,
and
therefore
the
adverse
production
inefficiency
effect
is from
weak.
Although a higher m reduces R&D investments in this situation (which follows
Although(8)),
a higher
m reduces
R&D
investments
in dominates
this situation
from
Equation
the positive
effect of
higher
competition
the (which
effect onfollows
innovation
Equation
(8)),
the
positive
effect
of
higher
competition
dominates
the
effect
on
innovation
and the effect due to production inefficiency, and a higher m increases welfare.
andNext,
the effect
due to production
inefficiency,
andγ aand
higher
m increases
welfare.
we consider
the relationship
between
welfare
in Figure
5 for n ∈ [1, 10],
Next,
we
consider
the
relationship
between
𝛾
and
welfare
in
Figure
5 forconsidered
𝑛 ∈ [1,10],
m ∈ [1, 10] and γ ∈ [0, 1]. We have considered a demand function such as that
𝑚
∈
[1,10]
and
𝛾
∈
[0,1].
We
have
considered
a
demand
function
such
as
that
considered
in Singh & Vives [76]. It follows from Singh & Vives [76] that a higher γ reduces welfare for
in Singh
Vives [76].
It of
follows
fromThis
Singh
& Vivesbecause
[76] thata ahigher
higherγ,𝛾while
reduces
welfare
the
given &
marginal
costs
the firms.
happens
increasing
for the givenreduces
marginal
costs of
theThis
firms.
This happens
because
a higher
𝛾, while
increascompetition,
market
size.
adverse
market size
effect
dominates
the positive
ing competition, reduces market size. This adverse market size effect dominates the positive effect of competition, and a higher 𝛾 reduces welfare. Singh & Vives [76] did not
consider innovation. However, we find that a similar result holds even with innovation.
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Imposing symmetry on Equation (11), we obtain the effect of a change in m
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Next, we show the impact on aggregate R&D investments. When (the total
number of
)
firms is constant, the aggregate R&D investments are (𝐾 − 𝑚)𝑥 and ∂(K −m) xC< 0. For a
C
firms is constant, the aggregate R&D investments are (K − m) x and
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number of technology leaders, n. We find that the former effect is dominated by the latter
of technology leaders, n. We find that the former effect is dominated by the latter effect,
effect, and a lower m increases aggregate R&D investments.
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6. Conclusions
We provide the literature with a new perspective on competition and innovation
by considering technology leaders or innovating firms and technology followers or noninnovating firms. Both inhabit a unified market and strategically affect each other. This
framework helps to explain the well-cited empirical evidence of an inverted-U relationship
between competition and aggregate innovation. This may happen if competition is affected
by the number of technology followers.
We also show the implications of the number of technology leaders, product differentiation, and the composition of technology leaders and technology followers for individual
and aggregate R&D investments. The presence of more technology leaders decreases individual R&D investments but increases aggregate R&D investments. If the total number of
firms remains the same but the composition of technology leaders and followers changes in
favor of leaders (followers), individual R&D investments decrease (increase) but aggregate
R&D investments increase (decrease). The relationship between competition and R&D
investments can be U-shaped if the intensity of competition is measured by product substitutability. We further show that the presence of more firms may reduce welfare, contrasting
with the classic view that more competition increases social welfare.
Our results are important for competition policies, particularly because the factors of
legal structure, intellectual law enforcement, availability of venture capital, and innovative
infrastructure (such as the supply of a STEM-educated labor force, etc.) all play very
important roles in determining the fraction of firms that feel comfortable in engaging in or
expanding their innovative activities.
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authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
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